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Faith, Family, and Feminism: Irreconcilable 
Differences?1 
Bonnie J. MiHer-McLemore2 
The purpose of this article is to characterize and evaluate the phases through 
which feminist positions on the family have evolved in recent history and to 
suggest feminists in Christian and Jewish theology and religious studies as 
among the most important participants in current discussions about the family. 
In a recent correspondence, a United Methodist colleague wrote, "My 
take on the name of your lecture is that instead of 'Faith, Family, and Femi­
nism: Irreconcilable Differences?' (with a question mark) it would be better 
named, 'Faith, Family, and Patriarchy: Irreconcilable Differences'-NO 
QUESTION." My correspondent had read my book Also A Mother: Work 
and Family as Theological Dilemma (1994) and anticipated major premises 
of a forthcoming book, From Culture U0rs to Common Ground: Religion 
and the American Family Debate (1997): contrary to popular public opinion, 
feminists by and large are not against families per se, although they are 
by and large against certain kinds of families. Moreover, many feminist 
theologians would contend that certain families-patriarehally-organized 
families-arc not faithful Christian families. New interpretations of scrip­
ture and Christian history challenge male dominance in Christian families. 
When feminism is defined as the repudiation of any ranking of people as 
IThis article was originally delivered as a lecture at Ewha Womans University in Seolll, Korea, 
April 27, 1997. I thank both Kyung-Sook Lee, Director of Ewha Institute for Women's 
Theological Studies and Professor of Christian Studies, for the invitation to speak and 
Geunhee Yu for the superb job in translating. The article draws on research in both Also 
A Mother: Work and Family as Theological Dilemma (1994) and a forthcoming book, From 
Cul/ure Wars to Common Ground: Religion and the American Family Debate (1997). 
2Bonnie J. MiUer-McLemore is Associate Professor of Pastoral Theology at Vanderbilt Uni­
versity Divinity School. For additional information or comment, her address is Vanderbilt 
University Divinity School, Nashville, Tennessee 37027. 
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inferior or superior according to various traits of human nature-a defini­
tion to which many feminists adhere-therc are more people who qualify 
as Christian feminists than most people might initially imagine. 
While reigning stereotypes that cast feminists as anti-men and anti­
children may capture a bit of the flavor of feminist struggles to claim a 
place for women, they sorely miss the substance of the struggles. Although 
feminists certainly challenged institutional views of motherhood and family 
that constrained and harmed women, and challenged the men who de­
pended upon these views, few feminists are actually either anti-men or anti­
children. 
In my remarks, I want to develop two points: (a) those struggling in 
families, working with families, or proposing new family programs and val­
ues in the United States need a better understanding of the phases through 
which feminism has evolved in its most recent history in order to make the 
best use of its contributions as well as to avoid some of its pitfalls; and (b) 
feminists in Christian and Jewish theology arc among the most important 
participants in current discussions about the family. I will sketch the con­
tributions of feminist theological views of the family as an important step 
through the impasses in secular feminism and in the family debate more 
generally. 
Feminist theory on the family in secular circles can be traced from (a) 
an early individualism of secular "humanist feminism" to (b) an emphasis 
on women's nature in secular "gynoccntric feminism" to (c) a conservative 
pro-family feminism to (d) a responding progressive pro-family diversity 
feminism. Partially corresponding to these developments, in theological cir­
cles feminist theory on the family can be traced from (a) a humanist em­
phasis in early theological feminism to (b) a gynocentric religious feminism 
to (c) a nascent ecological religious feminism that celebrates both the per­
sonhood and embodied love of women and men. 
To state my thesis in a more general way: Secular feminism needs criti­
cal appropriation of particular faith traditions and more careful delibera­
tion on family ideals and the family debate needs a carefully reconstructed 
feminism to solve some of the very problems for which feminists themselves 
are often wrongly blamed. Feminists in religion are strongly positioned to 
provide both new understandings of Christian faith and new understandings 
of families. Neither Christian theology, nor families, nor feminism will fare 
well without greater effort to bring these three into significant conversation. 
FEMINISM: DEFINITIONS, PERIODS, AND IMPASSES 
The question-"faith, family, and feminism-are they irreconcil­
able?" -must be restated. We are better off asking about feminisms plural, 
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and indeed, faitill and families. Feminism is not and has never been mono­
lithic. To assume feminists are anti-men, anti-children, and anti-family is 
inaccurate so long as there are pro-family feminists. And there are. 
Why then has the question of irreconcilability surfaced? To claim one­
self a feminist means minimally that one hopes for a society and perhaps 
a religion in which men do not dominate women, power is shared in fami­
lies and beyond, and the good of women is sought as an essential part of 
the good society and the good faith. Not surprisingly, given these hopes, 
the most provocative actions by feminists have had to do with the family 
and with religious faith as key sites for the perpetuation of patriar­
chy-from challenging images of God and women's roles in religious con­
gregations to urging a redistribution of household and mothering labor to 
identifying domestic violence to stressing the importance of women's eco­
nomic viability (Goodrich, Rampage, Ellman, and Halstead, 1988, p. 11). 
One of the key problems then that feminists in religion must face, and 
those who wish to promote a good family' theory in general, is how to pre­
serve what is good in families and good in religious faith without preserving 
patriarchy? (Green, 1995, pp. 5-6). 
Attempts to answer this important question have taken distinct forms 
among feminists. In both secular and Christian feminism, we can see a sig­
nificant shift in feminist strategies from a rejection to a qualified restoration 
of motherhood, but the questions of motherhood and the role of families are 
far from resolved. In my examination, I observe two important positions or 
phases in recent feminist approaches to the family in the U.S.: (a) a move­
ment from humanist, rights-oriented family id'eals to gynocentric, relational 
family ideals (see Young, 1985; Offen, 1988) and, then, in the last decade, 
(b) a tension between progressive pro-family-diversity views and conselvative 
pro-two-parent family views. Let me describe the contributions and problems 
of these two movements, with only brief commentary on the most recent still 
evolving tension. 
In the 1960s and 70s, "humanist feminists" promoted the extremely 
important views that (a) sexual relations are social and political construc­
tions that involve an asymmetric distribution of power between women and 
men; and (b) that cultural assumptions about female biology, the biological 
family, and child bearing and rearing have often obstructed the freedom 
and aspirations of women. At the same time, in claiming women's rights, 
humanist feminists tended to dismiss female reproduction as a curse, preg­
nancy as an ordeal, the keeping of a home as a debilitating imprisonment, 
and children as a hindrance to the development of a woman's full potential. 
Humanist feminists contested powerful demons: "a post-World War II 
North American mindset that idealized the breadwinner husband, his 
homemaker wife, and the increasingly isolated suburban, nuclear household 
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with its fascinating gadgets and fast foods" (Miller-McLemore, 1996, p. 
277). Behind this stood the nineteenth-century Victorian ideal of motherly 
domesticity, now firmly entrenched in the modern psyche. These images 
of motherhood were bolstered by religious ideals of moral piety, sexual 
purity, and wifely submission. And they assumed a white, middle-class 
whose ability to create such a unique home environment partially depended 
on immense sacrifices by the working class and other ethnic groups who 
often could not. When those in the women's movement in the 1960s chal­
lenged the 1950s image of happiness, they demanded something few women 
had ever had before-parity with men in the marketplace and in the house­
hold. However, in seeking equal pay and a shared family life, they neither 
anticipated the immense emotional and social roadblocks nor understood 
the ways in which their challenge to sexism was blind to racist and classist 
superstructures that also preserved structures of inequality (pp. 277-78). 
Growing awareness of the different ways women in diverse economic 
and ethnic groups experienced motherhood helped initiate a change in 
feminist strategies (Brock, 1995). Feminist protests about the entrapments 
of the housewife "do not make much sense to those robbed of chances to 
establish safe, strong homes, or to those fighting to prepare their children 
for survival in a hostile, racist, and discriminatory environment" (Miller­
McLemore, 1995, p. 190; see also Peters, 1988). For poor women and 
women of color, it is not motherhood that is the obstacle to freedom, but 
racism, lack of jobs, skills, education, and a number of other issues. Moth­
erhood, rather than being derided as an exploitative, oppressive, or sexist 
institution, must be cherished to persist at all, for the sake of the endurance 
of the larger group. 
Two other ingredients beside this helped cause a shift in feminist strate­
gies: (a) the recognition by feminists of the powerful meaning and impor­
tance of motherhood itself and (b) the recognition of the notorious "second 
shift," the domestic labor women perform, now on top of paid employment. 
In Maternal Thinking (1989), philosopher Sara Ruddick dares to suggest that 
through the very act of securing children's survival mothers themselves en­
gage in seldom recognized complex philosophical and ethical thought proc­
esses. In a kind of cultural gestalt, across a variety of disciplines, from law to 
literature, scholars began to notice the ways in which psychological analysis, 
literary critique, legal practice, moral theory, public policy, and so forth have 
ignored the mother as a subject. Many began to assert the critical role of the 
mother as thinker and participant in her own right. 
Moreover, middle-class mothers who began to work glimpsed problems 
that working-strata women and single mothers have always known and en­
dured to some extent: what Arlie Hochschild popularized as the "second 
shift." Based on time use studies done in the 1960s and 1970s, Hochschild 
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estimates that over a year women worked an "extra month of twenty-four­
hour days a year. Over a dozen years, it was an extra year of twenty-four­
hour-days" (1989, pp. 3-4, emphasis in original text). When the framework 
is stretched beyond the United States, the distortions only grow more ap­
parent. A 1980 United Nations report indicates that women world-wide 
perform two-thirds of the world's labor, receive ten percent of the pay, and 
own one percent of the property. 
Feminists still wanted equality with men, but now recognized that 
equality must rccognize differences, including those differences created by 
motherhood. Feminists realized the import of maternal and domestic labor. 
As long as the workplace still expects the worker to have a wife or a servant, 
as long as men are no more willing to pick up the broom than their fathers, 
and as long as an underclass of women take care of the homes and children 
of those in the upper stratas, certain feminist strategies for change will 
simply be ineffective. 
In the 1980s, feminists began to identify the problems with defining 
female nature as the primary vehicle of women's oppression. Instead, 
"gynocentric feminists" reclaimed female reproductive capacity and 
women's bodily experiences more generally as a source for an even more 
radical critique of society and of the ways in which domestic and caring 
labor, the female body, and nature itself are devalued and ignored (Young, 
1985). At the same time, while embodied motherhood is given a powerful 
place in gynocentric feminism, biological fatherhood holds little meaning. 
Gynocentric feminists tend to reduce the richness of the human relation­
ships that comprise families and to promote a rather stark ideal of unac­
companied motherhood or motherhood as a personal, independent, 
unfettered choice and activity. In short, where humanist feminists have 
striven for personal autonomy and entrance into male-dominated institu­
tions, gynocentric feminists eelehrate women's maternal role as a way to 
mount a wider-ranging critique of these institutions. Neither group spends 
much time asking about the complex relationship between gender equality 
and the demands of birthing and rearing offspring. And neither group 
spends much time asking about the roles of wider social institutions from 
motherhood to parenthood to marriage to congregational life. 
In the last decade, one group of feminists did begin to givc more atten­
tion to the needs of children with decidedly mixed results for feminism: con­
servative pro-family feminists. Progressive feminist Judith Stacey (1986) 
coined this descriptive label and it reflects her critique. She is justifiably wor­
ried that conservative pro-family feminists, such as Betty Friedan, Jean 
Bethke Elshtain, and Germaine Greer, jettison core beliefs and politics of 
the women's movement by affirming gender differences and by repudiating 
sexual politics that have shown sexual relations to be oppressive socio-politi­
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cal constructions (see Elshtain, 1981, 1990, 1993). Progressive feminists re­
fuse to place the good of family and societal preservation ahead of the good 
of women and enter the family discussion as advocates of family diversity. At 
the same time, progressive feminists tend to obscure the fine line between 
openness to diverse forms of the family and advocacy of random, unstable 
ambiguities in family life. Stacey herself is quite willing to tolerate the gross 
ambiguities of the postmodern family-the "multiplicity of family and house­
hold arrangements that we inhabit uneasily and reconstitute frequently in 
response to changing personal and occupational circumstances" (1990, p. 
17)-despite the problems for children and adult alike. 
With secular humanist and gynocentric feminism and with conservative 
and progressive feminism we arrive at a series of impasses. Neither con­
servative or progressive feminists seem able or willing to envision a social 
policy supporting both two-parent families and single mothers or gay and 
lesbian parenting. The empowerment of one, it seems, means the disem­
powerment of the other. And neither humanist nor gynocentric feminists 
seem able to envision gender and sexuality as a complex mix of biological 
and social elements, either seeing sexuality and families as social construc­
tions or seeing sexuality as largely non-malleable, biological qualities with 
a universal, cross-cultural character. In the tension between these two po­
sitions we reach a stalemate sometimes characterized by name-calling. So 
we have Stacey, who advocates "Brave New Families" of fluid, diverse, re­
constituted combinations, calling Elshtain a "new family value crusader" 
and Bethke Elshtain accusing Stacey of "ideological stalking" (Stacey, 1994, 
pp. 119-22; Shore, 1996, p. 29). 
FEMINISTS IN RELIGION: A PATH THROUGH THE IMPASSES 
So what about religious faith? When the early women's movement con­
demned Christianity for lending religious sanction to male superiority and 
female submission, for the most part feminist theologians in the 1960s and 
early 1970s agreed with this critique. Religious reinforcement of sexism was 
contested on at least three fronts: male God language and ideology; the 
exclusion of women from religious vocation and reflection; and the religious 
sanction of subordination of women and mothers in the home. Initially, 
feminist theologians used the tactics of secular humanist feminism to chal­
lenge exclusive language, secure ministerial positions, and dispute male 
headship in the family. 
By the late 1970s and 1980s, however, the feminist project in theology 
shifted significantly from a critique of a male-dominated Christianity to a 
reconstruction of its positive meanings based on a women-centered per­
spective. As early as 1981, Jewish feminist theologian Judith Plaskow ob­
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served that particular faith traditions within feminist theology offer "a pos­
sible path beyond" the tendency toward dualism present in contemporary 
secular feminist theory. Perhaps because feminists in religion "have been 
forced to grapple with historical images of women," they generally have 
not found either rejection of women's body experience or exaltation of it 
an attractive path (Plaskow, 1981, p. 57). As a test case, Plaskow attempts 
a feminist theological analysis of pregnancy and motherhood to demon­
strate the indivisibility or inseparability of body and mind, and body and 
freedom. Intricate human relationships are mediated through the flesh and 
yet are always culturally interpreted. Where many secular gynocentric femi­
nists have tended to underscore the opposition between the oppressive so­
cial institutionalization of motherhood and the positive natural experience 
of motherhood, the choice is not between institution and experience or 
"between patriarchy and nature" but between "oppressive institutions and 
institutions that are life-enhancing" (p. 65). 
The systematic theology of Roman Catholic feminist Rosemary Rad­
ford Ruether (1983) provides another example of an attempt to move 
through the impasses of secular feminism. She has consistently called for 
the revitalization of a Christian feminist voice on the family. Ruether her­
self has the most systematically developed history of the family in Christian 
thought even though she is little known for this. One of her most significant 
contributions is her ability to identify extremes and argue for a mediating 
or transforming position. Sexism and God-Talk, one of the first full-fledged 
feminist theologies in 1983, contests the very nature of the impasse that 
arises between humanist and gynocentric feminist theory. She declares both 
the liberal feminist idealization of the male sphere and the romantic femi­
nist idealization of the female sphere misplaced from the perspective of 
the Christian paradigm of alienated or fallen human nature. She desires a 
more comprehensive vision that encompasses liberal feminist ideals of civil 
rights, socialist feminist ideals of economic independence, and radical femi­
nist ideals of the value of female self, body, and reproduction (Ruether, 
1983, pp. 216, 109). 
On what grounds does Ruether propose this vision? Both authentic hu­
man nature (in its unalienated original potential) and the revelation of Jesus 
confirm a fundamental egalitarianism at the heart of reality. Christian femi­
nism requires neither a call to androgyny nor a proclamation of feminine 
virtue but the assertion of humanity. The promotion of the "full humanity of 
women" is the critical principle of feminist theology. Genuine humanity re­
quires balancing male tendencies toward independence and female tenden­
cies toward relationality with the opposite qualities. Ruether's ideal is an 
escha tological wholeness that transcends gender stereotypes, synthesizing 
and transforming male and female characteristics. She retains a place for the 
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biological family. But it is an ambivalent place because women have been 
considerably oppressed by claims about female biological destiny. Still, 
Ruether's goal is not the equality-as-sameness of Jiberal, humanist feminism, 
but rather "affirms genuine variety and particularity .... a mutuality that 
allows us to affirm different ways of being" (Ruether, 1983, p. 7). 
But Ruether does not go far enough in developing an adequate theory 
and practice for families today. More recently, my own work on the family 
in Protestant feminist theology and on developing a feminist maternal the­
ology introduces what might be characterized as slightly more gynocentric 
concerns about the mothcr's voice and shared responsibility for home and' 
children. Resurrecting the stalled revolution of gender justice involves chal­
lenging an economic and social system that views children, home, and com­
munity life as "non-work," that views market labor as almost completely 
independent of the labors of family and community, and that brackets thc 
needs of children. Genuine change for women, men, and families means 
recognizing motherhood and domestic matters for their critical place in 
human survival and for the real hours of labor that they entail. It even 
means finding feminist values in motherhood' in its many diverse shapes 
and forms without thereby returning women to motherhood and marriage 
as singular, viable, exclusive careers. But ultimately, from a theological per­
spective, survival of women in families and the sustenancc of families at 
large means challenging conventional ideas about "the Christian family" 
and reconstructing new religious family values and practices of love as mu­
tuality, equality, and justice. 
Broadly speak1ing, white, middle-class feminist Christian theologians 
have worked harder to promote the feminist view that the patriarchal family 
no longer has a place than actually to identify alternative Christian family 
models. The conversation is even more sparse when it comes to the role 
of motherhood. Many theologians are mothers, and advocate maternal God 
imagery and language, but few have investigated in any depth what is 
learned about Christianity from this pivotal life experience. Few have made 
the complex intersection of work and family a primary topic of theological 
research. Hence I initiated a careful study of the complex relationship be­
tween Christianity, Christian feminism, mothers, families, and work. 
Western theology and society have yet to recover from the likes of the 
author of First Timothy and the damage perpetuated in Paul's name. But 
fresh interpretations of scripture and traditions regarding women's roles 
within families are finaIly beginning to have some impact. Women, Timothy 
declares, shall neither teach nor have "authority over a man." The very 
order of human creation dictates that women follow men, and in the fall, 
Eve, not Adam, was deccived. If there is salvation to be had, it is "through 
childbearing" (I Tim. 2:11-15a). These ideas about female silence, sinful­
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ness, and the sanctity of childbearing have done their share of damage. No 
wonder some feminists have done away with Christian notions of family 
values and with the value of motherhood altogether. But, contrary to the 
impression given by the religious right, Christianity has not just endorsed 
male dominance and the patriarchal family as the Christian norm; it has 
also acted to liberate women and has itself created precedent for gender 
justice and women's equal worth within families and societies. Among the 
many scriptures and traditions, biblical theologians offer fresh readings of 
both the creation stories in Genesis as well as the stories in the gospels of 
Jesus' ministry and women in the early church in particular. On both ac­
counts, women are neither subservient nor submissive to men's and God's 
will but are distinctive and full participants in the events of creation and 
redemption. 
A few feminist theologians, like Christine Gudorf and myself, use ma­
ternal experience as a powerful tool to better understand theological cate­
gories of love, justice, redemption, human nature, and sacrifice. 
Significantly, a classic essay, written in 1958 at the very beginning of second 
wave feminism, represents a powerful exception to the general antipathy 
toward biological mothering in early feminism. Valerie Saiving begins her 
article, "The Human Situation: A Feminine View," by plainly stating, "I 
am a student of theology; I am also a woman" (Saiving, 1960, p. 100). 
Saiving has seen, she implies, some problems that men have traditionally 
overlooked. Her redefinition of sin as involving self-loss as much as pride 
and of love as requiring self-affirmation as much as self-giving should be 
recognized and remembered for priming the pump of a thirty-year period 
of revision and reconstruction in theology. And it is, I believe, her own 
maternal experience that furnishes the ground for a revelatory break­
through ,in the nature of self-love and agape. Although she never claims 
so directly and few other feminist theologians tend to notice, implicit in 
her essay is a third qualifying phrase, "I am also a mother." 
Women face an entirely different set of temptations, Saiving argues, 
that male theologians have seldom understood. Rather than prideful, self­
assertion that disregards the needs of others, mothers become so immersed 
in attending to external needs that they commit not the sin of self-centered 
will-to-power, but the sin of self-loss. Women's sin is better understood "as 
triviality, distractibility, and diffuseness; lack of an organizing center for 
focus; dependence on others for one's own self-definition ... in short, 
underdevelopment or negation of the self' (p. 109). Then, Saiving suggests 
something scarcely put forward as a religious ideal of salvation for mothers 
thus far: the moments, hours, and days of self-giving must be balanced by 
moments, hours, and days of "withdrawal into, and enrichment of, her in­
dividual selfuood if she is to remain a whole person" (pp. 108-9). 
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More recently, Gudorf (1985), a Roman Catholic ethicist, uses her ex­
periences of mothering an adopted two-year-old who could not walk, talk, 
or eat, and a five-year-old who could barely walk, dress, or wash himself 
to argue against inadequate understandings of Christian love or agape as 
unconditional, self-disregarding self-sacrifice. As she discovers through her 
own investment in mothering, Christian love must involve a measure of 
necessary self-love that actually enhances our capacity to give. All love in­
volves sacrifice, but ultimately aims at thc give and take of mutuality. Mo­
ments of sacrifice, including Christ's sacrifice on the cross, are "just 
that-moments in a process designed to end in mutual love" (p. 186). 
Maternal experience, I have argued, is a powerful tool to better un­
derstand theological categories. United States feminist theologians and 
churches alike must reevaluate the current value systems which reward ma­
terial productivity but ignore the work needed to raise the next generation. 
My book, Also A Mother (1994), makes four moves in this direction. It 
attempts: (a) to dispel the deadly silence that surrounds what it means that 
mostly women mother; (b) to correct both the tendency to trivialize on the 
one hand or to romanticize on the other what it really takes to raise a 
child in a complex, technological post-modern society; (c) to expose and 
correct inadequate psychological theories of human fulfillment, economic 
theories of work, and theological theories of love and vocation that em­
phasize material productivity, discount the entire structures of women's car­
ing labor that undergird the economy, and continue to promote 
self-sacrifice as an ultimate value; and finally (d) to recognize that the do­
mestic burdens about which I speak are not mine alone. Many women and 
some men face similar burdens with fewer material and relational resources 
than I do. Ultimately, however, feminists must move beyond a critique of 
motherhood as an oppressive institution and towards an understanding of 
mothering as a revelatory and valuable activity. For, with appropriate ca­
veats about the dangers of romanticizing and idealizing both mothers and 
children, it still might be argued that the "sacred appears powerfully, pre­
cisely in the midst of stewardship of the home, in embodied nurture, and 
[n holding up the world" (p. 157). 
Although it may be true that secular feminists have been more suc­
cessful in undermining patriarchy than in developing alternative family ide­
als, those addressing and struggling with current family dilemmas should 
not neglect the important contributions of feminists in religion. Religious 
feminists offer viable ways to address the impasses of secular feminism and 
the family debate. In contesting the idealization of female self-sacrifice, 
feminists in religion have focused on an ethic of radical mutuality, even if 
only a few have applied it specifically to family relations. Moreover, femi­
nists in religion have repudiated conventional dualisms which place blame 
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for family crises on either cultural individualism or a materialist, capitalist 
economy, or which understand sexual roles as either purely natural and 
universal or purely socially constructed ideology. 
Whereas many secular feminists develop family norms in an historical 
vacuum, religious feminists believe that sexuality and family are so entwined 
with religion that attempts to change either must begin with religious tra­
ditions themselves. Furthermore, theological feminists point out to secular 
skeptics that there are various prophetic streams of thought in Judaism 
and Christianity that contest conventional norms of male dominance and 
suggest models of radical equality. Feminist theologians identify several 
critical religious convictions which have important implications for women, 
men, and family ideals: the conviction that Christian and Jewish traditions 
are important sources of empowerment for contemporary families, despite 
their male-dominated and male-defined narratives and symbols; an empha­
sis on the creation of women in the image of God and hence our inherent 
worth as partners and co-creators in life; a demand for egalitarian rela­
tionships of love, justice, and shared responsibility within family and society; 
a call for redefining religious doctrines of love, sexuality, sin, and redemp­
tion; and a sensitivity to individuals and groups that have been relegated 
to the margins of social existence. These themes receive different interpre­
tations among various religious feminists in conservative and liberal circles, 
but the presence of them is pervasive. They suggest important new norms 
for women, men, children, and families. 
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